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Probate Law Meets the Digital Age 
Naomi Cahn* 
This Article explores the impact of federal law on a state fiduciary’s 
management of digital assets. It focuses on the lessons from the Stored 
Communications Act (“SCA”), initially enacted in 1986 as one part of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Although Congress designed the 
SCA to respond to concerns that Internet privacy posed new dilemmas with 
respect to application of the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections, the 
drafters did not explicitly consider how the SCA might affect property 
management and distribution. The resulting uncertainty affects anyone with 
an email account. 
While existing trusts and estates laws could legitimately be interpreted 
to encompass the new technologies, and while the laws applicable to these new 
technologies could be interpreted to account for wealth transfer, we are 
currently in a transition period. To fulfill their obligations, however, 
fiduciaries need certainty and uniformity. The article suggests reform to 
existing state and federal laws to ensure that nonprobate-focused federal laws 
ultimately effectuate the decedent’s intent. The lessons learned from examining 
the intersection of federal law focused on digital assets and of state fiduciary 
law extend more broadly to show the unintended consequences of other 
nonprobate-focused federal laws. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
At the most basic level, state wealth-transfer law is designed to 
effectuate the donor’s intent.1 Default rules, including intestacy and 
elective share statutes, foster these fundamental policies. Probate 
administration regimes facilitate collection of the decedent’s assets 
and protect the rights of the beneficiaries designated by the testator or 
those whom the state assumes would have been chosen. Developments 
in state trust law, respect for nonprobate transfers, and fiduciary 
obligations similarly effectuate the donor’s intent. These intent-
effectuating policies are at the core of the trusts and estates canon.2 
To be sure, there are countervailing state policies, including anti-
discrimination laws, taxation, and override rules such as the elective 
share protecting the state fisc,3 but these are recognized as exceptions 
to the basic principle of promoting the donor’s intent. States have 
adopted and adapted laws, ranging from revocation-on-divorce 
statutes to intestacy systems, to reflect local variations in 
presumptions concerning what the decedent actually prefers. 
Federal law, by contrast, is typically a blunter instrument. The 
potential intersection between the two systems of law occurs both 
when Congress initially enacts the legislation and then when courts 
interpret its applicability to trusts and estates issues. In the trusts 
 1.  See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Destructive Preemption of State Wealth Transfer Law in 
Beneficiary Designation Cases: Hillman Doubles Down on Egelhoff, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1670 
(2014) (“[T]he dominant policy of American wealth transfer law . . . is to give effect to the 
intention of the transferor.”). 
 2.  See, e.g., Naomi Cahn & Amy Ziettlow, “Making Things Fair”: An Empirical Study of 
How People Actually Approach the Wealth Transmission Process, ELDER L.J. (forthcoming 2015).  
 3.  The elective share (while it incorporates other goals) serves as an example of an 
override policy that protects the state budget from the claims of impoverished surviving spouses. 
See also Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The Case of Heterosexual 
Cohabitation, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 44 (2007) (discussing the privatization of partner 
dependence).  
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and estates field, federal law might play one of a variety of roles along 
a continuum: at one end, federal law might explicitly preempt state 
law, while at the other end, federal law might be irrelevant to state 
trusts and estates law (as is most often true). Between these two 
points, federal law can either work in tandem with or hamper state 
law. 
Indeed, the federal government sometimes does recognize the 
potential impact of federalism principles on state inheritance law and 
may explicitly defer to state wealth-transfer law both substantively 
and jurisdictionally. The probate exception embodies such deference;4 
in addition, various federal statutes explicitly incorporate a state’s 
postdeath wealth distribution system.5 In other situations, Congress 
may explicitly seek to control the wealth-transfer system, for example, 
through estate and gift taxes.6 
But many federal statutes are not so finely tuned.7 They are 
generally designed to further goals that, at least initially, have little 
or nothing to do with wealth transfer; they often do not even refer to 
the possibility of compatible—or incompatible—state laws. Even when 
 4.  See James E. Pfander & Michael J.T. Downey, In Search of the Probate Exception, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 1533 (2014). 
 5.  For example, in Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2023–24 (2012), the Supreme Court 
construed the Social Security Act’s provision:   
In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of a fully or currently 
insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner of Social 
Security shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of 
intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which such insured individual 
is domiciled at the time such applicant files application, or, if such insured individual 
is dead, by the courts of the State in which he was domiciled at the time of his death, 
or, if such insured individual is or was not so domiciled in any State, by the courts of 
the District of Columbia. Applicants who according to such law would have the same 
status relative to taking intestate personal property as a child or parent shall be 
deemed such. 
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2) (2012). The provision refers to “State” three times. See SUSAN GARY, 
JEROME BORISON, NAOMI CAHN & PAULA MONOPOLI, CONTEMPORARY TRUSTS AND ESTATES (2d 
ed. 2014). 
 6.  Even within that system, the Supreme Court has staked a role for state law. See supra 
note 5. 
 7.  See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Creeping Federalization of Wealth-Transfer Law, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 1395, 1639–44 (discussing federal pension law and the Supreme Court’s opinions 
in Egelhoff and Hillman). In explaining its decision, the Hillman Court noted: 
One can imagine plausible reasons to favor a different policy . . . a legislature could 
have thought that a default rule providing that insurance proceeds accrue to a widow 
or widower, and not a named beneficiary, would be more likely to align with most 
people's intentions. . . . But that is not the judgment Congress made. 
Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1952 (2013). 
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Congress regulates nonprobate transfers8 and explicitly addresses 
federalism issues, state trusts and estates law is not an explicit focus.9 
This Article explores the impact of federal law that is not 
specifically enacted to deal with wealth transfer on the executor’s 
marshaling and subsequent distribution of digital assets. (I label these 
laws “nonprobate-focused federal laws.”) In doing so, this Article 
focuses on the lessons from one such law: the Stored Communications 
Act (“SCA”), initially enacted in 1986 as one part of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”).10 Congress designed the SCA 
to respond to concerns that Internet privacy posed new dilemmas with 
respect to application of the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections. 
It regulates the relationship between the government, Internet service 
providers (“ISPs”), and users in two distinct ways.  
First, the statute establishes limits on the government’s ability 
to require ISPs to disclose information concerning their subscribers. 
An ISP may not disclose to the government any records concerning an 
account holder, nor the contents of any electronic communications, in 
the absence of an applicable exception, such as consent by the account 
holder.11  
Second, the statute establishes limits on the providers’ ability 
to disclose information voluntarily to the government or any other 
person or entity.12 Although the drafters tried to cover future 
 8.  See Waggoner, supra note 7, at 1651 (indicating that some nonprobate transfers are 
“authorized or regulated by federal law”). 
 9.  One such example is the broad supersession clauses in ERISA the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) and the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act 
(“FEGLIA”). 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); see Langbein, supra note 1, at 1671 (“[F]ederal law does not 
concern itself with the recurrent constructional complications that arise in the wealth transfer 
process . . . .”). FEGLIA was initially enacted in 1954, fifteen years before the Uniform Probate 
Code’s revocation upon divorce provision for wills, and more than three decades before that was 
extended to nonprobate transfers. See Waggoner, supra note 7, at 1640, 1643. Not surprisingly, 
FEGLIA’s preemption provision addresses only state regulation of group life insurance without 
any explicit reference to wills. 5 U.S.C. § 8709(d)(1).  
 10.  18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712. See generally Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored 
Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208 
(2004) (discussing the goals, structure, and text of the Stored Communications Act).    
 11.  18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) prohibits voluntary disclosure to anyone of the contents of an 
electronic communication, while 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) prevents the voluntary disclosure of 
records to the government (although not to others). Depending on the nature of the data, the 
government must obtain either a subpoena or a warrant, although there are some exceptions in 
the case of an emergency. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b). 
 12.  See Kerr, supra note 10, at 1212–13 (“The statute creates a set of Fourth Amendment-
like privacy protections by statute”). The 2013 revelations of Edward Snowden provide another 
angle on the Stored Communications Act and providers’ willingness to disclose. The providers 
didn’t want to disclose some information and the NSA either coerced them or simply took it 
without their knowledge. See, e.g., Ryan Lizza, The Metadata Program in Eleven Documents, 
THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/12/a-
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developments, at the time of the SCA’s enactment, the development of 
Facebook was still almost two decades away, the founding of Google 
was more than a decade in the future, and even the large-scale use of 
email was still a few years distant.13 The drafters were focused on 
privacy, not on how the SCA might affect fiduciary property 
management and distribution,14 and the SCA has not been amended 
since its original enactment. (Of course, few people recognized the 
potentially transformative potential of the Internet on trusts and 
estates practice at that point.) The resulting uncertainty affects 
anyone with an email account. It hampers fiduciaries, including 
personal representatives, conservators, agents acting pursuant to a 
power of attorney, and trustees who want to obtain access to any type 
of electronic communication, although it does not affect the ability of a 
fiduciary to distribute the assets held in the underlying account—once 
the fiduciary has been able to identify it. 
This Article argues that, as trusts and estates law and practice 
adjust to new technologies and their corresponding privacy 
protections, the process requires accommodation and adjustment. 
That is, while existing trusts and estates laws could legitimately be 
interpreted to encompass the new technologies with no need for 
revision, and while the laws applicable to these new technologies could 
be interpreted to account for wealth transfer, the common law process 
is typically not so seamless.15 The result, instead, is a transition 
period, with the expectation that existing legal structures will 
gradually absorb the new technology.  
Indeed, it is possible to interpret the SCA so that it does not 
bar access by a legally recognized fiduciary to the contents of an 
history-of-the-metadata-program-in-eleven-documents.html#slide_ss_0=1, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/8R7Y-GBAE; Ryan Lizza, State of Deception, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 16, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/12/16/131216fa_fact_lizza, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
F4KK-FVXG; Laura W. Murphy, The NSA’s Winter of Discontent, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 12, 
2013, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/laura-w-murphy/the-nsas-winter-of-discon_b_ 
4434455.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3V8U-6X6W. 
 13.  Ian Peter, The History of Email, NETHISTORY, http://www.nethistory.info/ 
History%20of%20the%20Internet/email.html, archived at http://perma.cc/EP9X-9JQA (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2014); see William Jeremy Robison, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy 
Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1198 (2010) (“It was on the cusp of 
this phase, with computer networking in its infancy, that Congress adopted the Stored 
Communications Act in 1986.”); Michael Helft & Claire Cain Miller, 1986 Privacy Law is Outrun 
by the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/10/technology/ 
10privacy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/4-2HL4. 
 14.  There was only one reported federal case concerning the relationship between the SCA 
and probate at the time of promulgation of the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act in 
July 2014. In re Facebook, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2012).  
 15.  See, e.g., Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077 (2003) 
(discussing the development of adoption law). 
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account holder’s communications. The existing SCA should be 
interpreted as permitting fiduciaries to access otherwise-protected 
content pursuant to state fiduciary law (a fiduciary stands in the 
shoes of the original account holder) or through exceptions to 
prohibited disclosures. Nonetheless, achieving this result is neither 
automatic nor guaranteed and may require some movement in each 
area of law. Instead, potential congressional amendments to the SCA, 
along with supporting state legislative enactments, could clarify this 
interpretation by defining “consent” by an electronic subscriber to 
include disclosure of the contents of email communication. Certainty 
and uniformity in this context could support fiduciaries seeking to 
fulfill their obligations. Such uniformity could be mandated if federal 
law were amended to include its own definitions of terms,16 to which 
states could refer to facilitate the probate process, or by uniform 
statutes adopted by all states. Each of these, of course, presents its 
own practical and political problems, but the underlying goals of 
promoting consistency and certainty in trusts and estates law show 
that federal law can play a constructive role in promoting state 
policies. The lessons learned from examining the intersection of 
federal law focused on digital assets and of state fiduciary law extend 
more broadly to show the unintended consequences of other 
nonprobate-focused federal laws.17 
In Part II, I discuss some of the complexities surrounding the 
inheritance of digital assets under state law. In Part III, I turn to the 
relevant federal statutes that have an impact on the transfer of digital 
assets. Part IV addresses the role of federal law, arguing that the 
federal statutes should be interpreted in light of relevant state law on 
inheritance addressed earlier. This final section suggests reform to 
existing state and federal laws to ensure that nonprobate-focused 
federal laws ultimately effectuate the decedent’s intent. 
II. DIGITAL ASSETS AND INHERITANCE 
Trusts and estates law focuses on the disposition of various 
forms of assets.18 Over the centuries, the types of assets have changed 
 16.  A federal definition of “child” that considered posthumous birth would have mooted 
Astrue, for example. 132 S. Ct. at 2023. 
 17.  This may suggest a parochialism—“states know best”—with respect to probate law; 
while others may make that argument, I am more concerned about laws with unintended 
consequences. 
 18.  Trusts and estates law is not just for wealthy individuals, even though it is also called 
“wealth transfer” law. See Naomi Cahn & Amy Ziettlow, “Making Things Fair:” An Empirical 
Study of How People Actually Approach the Wealth Transmission Process (2014) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with authors). The nonprobate revolution means that almost all workers 
 
7 – Cahn FINAL LOOK (Do Not Delete) 11/18/2014 3:22 PM 
2014] DIGITAL ASSETS 1703 
and expanded. In particular, new technologies pose new conundrums 
for trusts and estates law. With every change in forms of wealth, 
technology, or entertainment, trusts and estates law has had to adapt 
correspondingly, with doctrines pressured to expand beyond real 
property to stocks, bonds, copyrights—and now, digital assets. Digital 
assets present the same problems as other forms of new property; they 
are also problematic because federal law regulates some aspects of 
their existence. Privacy concerns, the reason for the federal laws 
themselves, pose a third complicating factor.19 A fourth distinguishing 
characteristic is their form of ownership, in which an account holder 
enters into a terms-of-service agreement that sets out the conditions of 
access. 
Digital assets are not the first intangible assets that estate 
planning attorneys have faced. Copyrights, for example, are assets 
regulated by federal law and capable of probate and nonprobate 
transfer.20 But unlike digital assets, which are subject to terms-of-
service agreements with another party, copyrights clearly belong to 
the holder. In addition, although copyrights raise piracy concerns, 
they do not raise privacy issues. Like traditional letters, digital 
communications raise privacy concerns for both sender and recipient. 
This combination of novelty, federalism, privacy, and 
ownership issues has caused some of the difficulties in handling 
digital assets. Digital assets are a modern manifestation of the 
changing nature of assets and, in turn, the need for trusts and estates 
law to adapt. Of course, in many ways, digital assets could fit into 
existing paradigms.21 If one analogizes digital assets to tangible assets 
have signed some type of beneficiary designation form. See Stewart Sterk & Melanie Leslie, 
Accidental Inheritance: Retirement Accounts and the Hidden Law of Succession, 89 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 165, 169 (2014). Moreover, even people with no financial assets almost certainly have some 
digital assets and may have emotional mementos of value to them or to others. 
 19.  See generally Orin S. Kerr, Foreword: Accounting for Technological Change, 36 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 405 (2013) (contrasting predigital searches of pockets versus 
smartphones).  
 20.  17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2012) provides: “The ownership of a copyright . . . may be 
bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession”; 
see Devan R. Desai, The Life and Death of Copyright, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 219, 264 
(“Intergenerational equity . . . may show that society’s claim is greater than an author’s lineal 
descendants.”); Andrea Farkas, Comment, I’ll be Back? The Complications Heirs Face When 
Terminating a Deceased Author’s Online Copyright Licenses, 5 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 
411, 413 (2013) (“Many heirs are unaware that they possess such a right at all . . . .”). 
 21.  They do not, for example, present the possibility for a “revolution.” See John Langbein, 
The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 
1108–09 (1984) (discussing how probate avoidance and changes in the nature of wealth lead to a 
“nonprobate revolution”); Sterk & Leslie, supra note 18, at 176–77 (“This [current] framework 
generates significant advantages.”). 
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or real property, then few problems should arise when the executor or 
personal representative seeks to collect estate assets.  
Yet the particular role of federal law as a source of regulation, 
with its overarching goal protecting privacy in a world where freedom 
from surveillance,22 has assumed new meanings (note that this goal is 
inherently compatible with fiduciary law, given the stringent duties of 
state fiduciaries). While this Article focuses on only one aspect of the 
need to coordinate state and federal law, separate state law issues 
relating to ownership of digital assets may also require federal 
resolution. For example, subscribers typically acquire digital assets 
via a terms-of-service agreement that sets out the ownership or 
licensing of those assets, and the global reach of these agreements 
might appropriately be a concern of federal law. 
  An initial question requires determining just what constitutes a 
digital asset. The Uniform Law Commission’s Uniform Fiduciary 
Access to Digital Assets Act (“UFADAA”) defines a digital asset as “a 
record that is electronic.”23 As such, it includes any information that is 
stored on the Internet or on a digital device (such as a computer or 
smartphone), including music, photos, social media profiles, websites, 
bitcoins,24 emails, and electronic documents governing the underlying 
accounts through which other property may be accessed.25 
Individuals have differing legal relationships to these assets. 
For most sites, a user enters into some kind of a terms-of-service 
 22.  See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1905 (2013) (“Privacy 
therefore is an indispensable structural feature of liberal democratic political systems.”); Daniel 
Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1880, 1880 (2013) (“The goal of this bundle of rights is to provide people with control over their 
personal data . . . .”).  
 23.  UFADAA § 3(9) (2014), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/ 
Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2014jul31_UFADAA%20as%20approved%20Jul
y%202014%20before%20styling%20and%20without%20comments.pdf, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/YK4W-7V2N. “Electronic” and “record” are both defined in the Act.  
 24.  BITCOIN, http://bitcoin.org/en/, archived at http://perma.cc/H5DE-WZ84 (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2014). Bitcoins are a virtual currency that are not government sponsored, although an 
increasing number of businesses, ranging from sports stores to travel destinations to porn sites, 
accept payment in bitcoins. Id.; Shopping with Bitcoin in United States, SPENDBITCOINS, 
https://www.spendbitcoins.com/places/?place_type=shopping, archived at http://perma.cc/7RNN-
LBWZ (last visited Sept. 8, 2014). 
 25.  See, e.g., Gerry W. Beyer & Naomi Cahn, Digital Planning: The Future of Elder Law, 9 
NAELA J. 135, 137–38 (2013) (classifying digital assets as “personal assets,” “social media 
assets,” “financial accounts,” and “business accounts”); Lilian Edwards & Edina Harbinja, 
Protecting Post-Mortem Privacy: Reconsidering the Privacy Interests of the Deceased in a Digital 
World, 32 CARD. ARTS & ENT. L.J. 101, 104–05 (2013) (broadly defining “digital assets”); Jamie P. 
Hopkins, Afterlife in the Cloud: Managing a Digital Estate, 5 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. J. 209, 211 
(2013) (broadly defining “digital assets”). 
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agreement,26 clicking through a series of statements. While early 
terms-of-use agreements set out terms on a separate site, they have 
evolved towards a requirement that users click “I agree” before being 
bound.27 Depending on the type of agreement, a user may own, 
outright, an asset that is itself capable of sale or gift during life or 
upon death, or the user may simply hold a license that expires when 
the account holder does.28 For fiduciaries, the first step is learning 
about and, where necessary, accessing these assets. Then, if permitted 
by the terms-of-service agreement and the account holder’s intent, the 
fiduciary’s second step would be to distribute these assets 
appropriately.29 Access, however, is the critical step; it provides 
information about the scope of the account holder’s assets (including 
both digital and nondigital assets), which then facilitates the 
disposition of those assets. Emails can serve as the source for 
fiduciaries to marshal both known and unknown assets, revealing the 
digital equivalent of the money under the mattress or the locked box 
stored underground. 
 26.  The American Law Institute has even completed a project in this area, focusing on 
what are often called “end user license agreements” (“EULAs”). PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
SOFTWARE CONTRACTS 101–44 (2010); see Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in 
Stone? Change and Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240, 
241–50 (2013) (finding pro-seller EULAs have increased as well as their enforceability); 
Contracts: Click Wrap Licenses, INTERNET LAW TREATISE, https://ilt.eff.org/index.php/Contracts: 
Click_Wrap_Licenses, archived at http://perma.cc/VR5R-QE8R (last modified Oct. 7, 2011, 2:59 
PM) (providing information on websites where a user must agree to the terms before access). 
 27.  Michael L. Rustad & Maria Vittoria Onufrio, Reconceptualizing Consumer Terms of Use 
for a Globalized Knowledge Economy, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1085, 1099–1102 (2012); see Ajemian v. 
Yahoo!, 987 N.E.2d 604, 612–15 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (refusing to enforce choice of law coercive 
TOS provisions). Thousands of customers of Gamestation, a British game site, “sold their souls” 
to the site when they clicked through their sign-up agreements. Catharine Smith, 7,500 Online 
Shoppers Accidentally Sold Their Souls to Gamestation, HUFFINGTON POST, (May 25, 2011, 5:10 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/17/gamestation-grabs-souls-o_n_541549.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/XVA5-HKLQ; Selling Your Soul, and Other Fine Print, FOX & 
MATTSON, P.C. (Dec. 30, 2013), http://galaw.com/selling-your-soul-and-other-fine-print/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/WR3C-WHJK. 
 28.  See Jamie Patrick Hopkins & Ilya Alexander Lipin, Viable Solutions to the Digital 
Estate Planning Dilemma, 99 IOWA L REV. BULL. 61, 65–67 (2014) (discussing difficulties 
surrounding digital asset ownership); David Horton, Indescendibility, 102 CAL. L. REV. 543, 565–
67, 569–70 (2014) (discussing issues related to indescendibility by contract, when companies 
limit consumers’ conveyance rights); Rustad & Onufrio, supra note 27, at 1092 (stating that 
companies use EULAs to prohibit transfers and assignments of property). Professor Horton 
provides examples of specific types of agreements. 
 29.  See Horton, supra note 28 (noting the unresolved issue of indesendibility by contract in 
the Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act). Distribution of assets upon death is, of course, 
typically the concern of state law. 
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III. DIGITAL ASSETS AND FEDERAL LAW 
Like ERISA, the federal laws affecting digital assets were 
enacted without consideration of state trusts and estates law. The 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, for example, is an antihacking law;30 
presumably, the type of trespass that it prevents does not include 
access to digital assets and computers by a state-authorized 
fiduciary.31 The SCA, part of the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act of 1986, governs the privacy of communications and remotely 
stored information on the Internet. It covers entities that provide 
electronic communication services, including storage, to the public.32 
 30.  18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). See Note, The Vagaries of Vagueness: Rethinking the CFAA as 
a Problem of Private Nondelegation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 751, 751 (2013) (“The Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFAA) was enacted with the primary purpose of combating computer 
hacking.”). 
 31.  When a fiduciary accesses the decedent’s property and uses a key to enter the home 
and sift through an estate as part of complying with her responsibilities to marshal estate assets, 
there is a strong argument that this is comparable to use of a username and password to access 
an account or an electronic device. Unlike access to the decedent’s house, however, access to a 
digital account is presumably governed by a terms-of-service agreement that may prohibit third-
party access; consequently, the fiduciary may still be violating the CFAA by exceeding access 
authorized by the terms-of-service agreement. See James D. Lamm, Christina L. Kunz, Damien 
A. Riehl & Peter John Rademacher, The Digital Death Conundrum: How Federal and State Laws 
Prevent Fiduciaries from Managing Digital Property, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 385, 400–01 (2014) 
(discussing how a terms-of-service agreement may prevent third-party access, and therefore, 
while a digital asset owner may consent to fiduciary access, a TOS may expressly prohibit it); cf. 
Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Individuals other than the 
computer’s owner may be proximately harmed by unauthorized access, particularly if they have 
rights to data stored on it.”).  
 32.  See Suzanne B. Walsh, Coming Soon to a Legislature Near You: Comprehensive State 
Law Governing Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 429, 433–34 (2014) 
(noting restrictions on providers subject to the SCA); Suzanne Brown Walsh & Conrad Teitell, 
An Eye Towards the Future: Looking Through a Google Glass Brightly—Paul’s Email to the 
Corinthians, 153 TR. & EST. 32, 32–39 (2014), available at http://wealthmanagement.com/estate-
planning/protecting-clients-digital-assets, archived at http://perma.cc/ZUC-5NXZ (discussing how 
the SCA affects providers); Kerr, supra note 10, at 1213–14 (SCA protects information given to 
two types of network providers: electronic communication service (ECS) and remote computing 
service (RCS)). Commercial systems available to the public, such as Gmail or Yahoo, are covered, 
while private systems, such as those used and established by an employer with access limited to 
a specified group, are not covered. The term "electronic storage" covers two (potentially 
overlapping) categories: “(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic 
communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such 
communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such 
communication.” § 2510(17) (definitions additionally given same meaning in § 2711(1)). Courts 
have held that subsection (A) covers email messages stored on the provider’s server pending 
delivery to the recipient. See In re DoubleClick Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (indicating § 2510(17)(A) covers email messages); Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 
F.Supp.2d 623, 636 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding the Stored Communications Act does not cover post-
transmission interception but covers interceptions while an email is transmitted), aff’d in part, 
352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2003). See generally UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL ch. 9-48.000 
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This includes email systems.33 Violations of the SCA provisions can 
result in civil and criminal penalties.34 
The SCA addresses access alone, rather than ownership and 
disposition of assets. While access is the first step in disposition,35 the 
SCA is concerned only with protecting the privacy of the account 
holder rather than with ownership of the communications or of the 
underlying account. It may, at least temporarily, present difficulties 
for authorized fiduciaries who seek access to certain types of material 
directly from an ISP. 
Although the SCA applies to a wide variety of Internet 
activities, portions of the law are widely recognized as outdated and in 
need of adaptation to technological advances that have occurred since 
it was passed.36 Concerns over the SCA’s revision are far broader than 
those relevant to trusts and estates practitioners, most generally 
relating to the need to protect privacy. Despite such sweeping 
concerns, the framework put in place by the SCA remains the basis 
from which courts decide Internet privacy cases. 
Most fundamentally, the Act regulates the disclosure of 
communications and other information in the possession of ISPs. It 
sets out the process that the government must follow to compel 
disclosure from an ISP37 and details the procedures for voluntary 
disclosure of such information along with penalties for unauthorized 
disclosures.38 The Act applies to both providers of electronic 
communication services (“ECS”) and providers of remote computing 
(1997), http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/48mcrm.htm, archived 
at http://perma.cc/MW5Q-329E (discussing government’s interpretation of the SCA). 
 33.  DoubleClick, 154 F.Supp.2d at 512; Fraser, 135 F.Supp.2d at 636. 
 34.  § 2701(b); § 2707(b); e.g., Cheng v. Romo, No. 11-10007-DJC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
28374, at *4–7 (D.C. Mass. March 6, 2014).  
 35.  See Horton, supra note 28, at 569–70 (critiquing state laws for not addressing issues 
involving the disposition of digital assets). 
 36.  See generally Lindsay S. Feuer, Note, Who Is Poking Around Your Facebook Profile?: 
The Need to Reform the Stored Communications Act to Reflect a Lack of Privacy on Social 
Networking Websites, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 473, 475–76, 502–03, 511–15 (2011) (arguing the SCA 
needs reform due to social media and technology); Achal Oza, Note, Amend the ECPA: Fourth 
Amendment Protection Erodes as E-Mails Get Dusty, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1043, 1046, 1072–73 (2008) 
(recommending changes to the ECPA to extend constitutionally owed privacy to email users); 
Kerr, supra note 10, at 30–41 (explaining that while the SCA is effective, it is outdated in some 
respects). 
 37.  § 2703. 
 38.  Id. § 2702. For a discussion of penalties, see CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R41733, PRIVACY: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY COMMUNICATIONS ACT, 1, 45–46 
(2012), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41733.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
C9JR-9NWR. 
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services (“RCS”).39 In its most basic form, as understood in 1986, this 
distinction hinges on whether the service provider is providing a 
communications service, rendering it an ECS provider, or a storage 
service, rendering it an RCS provider.40 An ISP can perform both 
functions at once. So long as its services are available to the public, it 
falls within the purview of the SCA’s privacy regulations.41 The 
 39.  E.g., § 2702. Note that the SCA does not apply to private email service providers. See 
§ 2702(a)(2) (specifying the prohibition applies to services provided to the public); Lamm et al., 
supra note 31, at 404 (stating the SCA excludes private email providers). 
 40.  § 2711(2) (definition of remote computing service). The differences relate to the 
immediate sending as opposed to storage: an ECS enables users to send and receive wire or 
electronic communications (acting more as a conduit), while an RCS provides computer storage 
or processing services by means of an electronic communications system.  
The problem now is that modern service providers no longer fall neatly into the 
categories. However, the categorization remains important because it affects the 
context in which a service provider may knowingly divulge the contents of a 
communication. . . .  
Essentially, a provider classified as an ECS is always prohibited from disclosing 
communications in electronic storage. On the other hand, an RCS is only prohibited 
from disclosing communications if the transmission was maintained solely for storage 
or computer processing purposes and if the provider is not authorized to access the 
contents of the communication for any purpose other than providing the services.  
Meera Unnithan Sossamon, Comment, Subpoenas and Social Networks: Fixing the Stored 
Communications Act in a Civil Litigation, 57 LOY. L. REV. 619, 625–26 (2011). The distinction 
between the two different types of providers arose in part due to businesses outsourcing their 
data processing and data storage needs. A provider can be both an ECS and RCS when it comes 
to the same communication. The ISP is an ECS at the point when an email is sent and awaits 
the recipient's retrieval. Once the recipient retrieves the email, the provider becomes an RCS if 
the recipient keeps the email on the provider's server. For a brief history of the precise 
technology regulated at the time, see Robison, supra note 13, at 1205–06 (explaining how 
providers transmitted emails and how Congress responded to the new technology). Moreover, the 
same entity may be an RCS or ECS as well as a non-SCA-covered entity; the legislative history 
indicates that communications must be analyzed separately to determine whether they are 
protected (just because an entity has some communications that may be covered, that does not 
extend to all of them). H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 65 (1986), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
jmd/ls/legislative_histories/pl99-508/houserept-99-647-1986.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
G28P-CPPJ; Hankins, infra note 42 (discussing public and private Facebook messages). 
41. Kerr, supra note 10, at 1216–17. Two separate privacy protections are contained in 18 
U.S.C. § 2702(a). They protect the contents of electronic communications: (1) that are in 
electronic storage by an entity that provides an electronic communication service to the public, 
18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1); and (2) that are carried or maintained by an entity that provides a remote 
computing service to the public. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2). By contrast, the content of an electronic 
communication that is readily accessible to the public is not protected. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i). 
 Court cases have reached differing conclusions on just when an email is in electronic 
storage and subject to the act’s protections. E.g., Cheng v. Romo, No. 11-10007-DJC, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 179727, at *5 (D. Mass. Dec. 20, 2013) (email is in electronic storage). Compare, 
e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding emails were in 
electronic storage), with United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 770–73 (C.D. Ill. 
2009) (finding, in the context of a criminal subpoena, that “[p]reviously opened emails stored by 
Microsoft for Hotmail [email system] users are not in electronic storage”), and United States v. 
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precise scope of coverage of specific ISPs is still not entirely clear, 
although it appears, for example, that Facebook and other social 
media sites are within the SCA’s ambit when it comes to limited-
access (not publicly available) materials.42 
The SCA also distinguishes between “content” information, 
meaning what is contained within communications generally, and 
“noncontent” information, defined as “record[s] or other information 
pertaining to a subscriber or customer” of the provider’s service.43 
These classifications are applicable only to the SCA’s exceptions—
those circumstances in which a provider is allowed to disclose 
information in its possession.44 An ISP may not only disclose 
noncontent material to any person other than a governmental entity 
(a group that would presumably include most fiduciaries) but also to 
any governmental entity with the account holder’s “lawful consent.” 
Noncontent information includes material about any communication 
sent, such as the addressee, sender, date/time, and other subscriber 
Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 291 (6th Cir. 2010) (same). Precise resolution of this issue does not, 
however, affect the analysis in this Article. 
 42.  See In re Facebook, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1205–06 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding 
Facebook does not have to produce records of a user’s account due to SCA protection, although 
not opining on whether an executor’s consent would be legally adequate to permit Facebook to 
disclose); Allen D. Hankins, Note, Compelling Disclosure of Facebook Content Under the Stored 
Communications Act, 17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 295, 309–11 (2012) (private Facebook 
messages are afforded protection). The SCA only protects electronic communications that, while 
provided by a public server, are still restricted. See Jim Lamm, Thoughts on the Stored 
Communications Act, Federal Preemption and Supremacy, and State Laws on Fiduciary Access to 
Digital Property, DIGITAL PASSING (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.digitalpassing.com/author/admin/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/Q2BT-A784 [hereinafter Lamm, Thoughts on the SCA]; Jim Lamm, 
Facebook Blocks Demands for Access to Deceased User’s Account, DIGITAL PASSING (Oct. 11, 
2012), http://www.digitalpassing.com/2012/10/11/facebook-blocks-demand-contents-deceased-
users-account/, archived at http://perma.cc/84QU-2D9B [hereinafter Lamm, Facebook Blocks 
Demands]. Thus, content available to anyone through your Facebook account is not covered, but 
content that only your “friends” can see is apparently covered. See Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean 
Hosp. Serv. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 659, 665–66 (D.N.J. 2013) (holding nonpublic Facebook posts 
are covered by SCA); Catherine Crane, Social Networking v. the Employment-at-Will Doctrine: A 
Potential Defense for Employees Fired for Facebooking, Terminated for Twittering, Booted for 
Blogging, and Sacked for Social Networking, 89 WASH. U.L. REV. 639, 668 (2012) (SCA protects 
private Facebook messages).  
 43.  See § 2702(b), (c); § 2510(8); H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 34; Kerr, supra note 10, at 1228 
(noncontent information includes “logs of account usage, mail header information minus the 
subject line, lists of outgoing e-mail addresses sent from an account and basic subscriber 
information all count as noncontent information”); Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope 
Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2121–23 (2009) (noting the SCA 
allows certain disclosures of noncontent information). At the time of the SCA’s enactment, pen 
registers, which record the phone numbers called from a particular telephone line, were held not 
to be content. H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 34. 
 44.  For records, as opposed to content, the ISP can voluntarily disclose with the customer’s 
lawful consent as well as to any entity other than the government. § 2702(c). 
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data.45 For content-based communications, by contrast, voluntary 
disclosure is only permitted for seven reasons. Most significantly, an 
ISP may divulge content information “with the lawful consent of the 
originator or an addressee or intended recipient of such 
communication, or the subscriber in the case of a remote computing 
service.”46 Interpreting this lawful consent exception is at the core of 
the problem for fiduciaries. 
Beyond the issue of lawful consent, additional legal rationales 
support fiduciary access to SCA-protected information. For example, if 
a fiduciary takes on the legal status of the account holder, then the 
fiduciary’s own lawful consent is itself enough to satisfy the SCA, and 
any possible provider liability pursuant to the SCA becomes 
irrelevant. In addition, it is worth pondering whether the SCA, as 
written, creates privacy protections that survive death, although it 
does apply when the account holder is incapacitated.47  
A. Lawful Consent by Whom? 
The SCA’s limitations on disclosure of information have 
significant implications for estate administration48 even though—or 
perhaps because—the provision does not explicitly address whether a 
fiduciary has lawful consent to access a decedent’s digital assets. 
While the authors of the SCA in the mid-1980s understood that 
technology would continue to evolve and develop, they surely never 
contemplated such dynamic changes in electronic communications and 
storage, as Congress defined them at the time. As such, the 
unauthorized access that Congress feared—from a potentially 
unknown third party with the intent to do harm to the subscriber or 
communicator or to benefit from the subscriber’s information—is 
fundamentally different from the access at issue when a court-
appointed fiduciary (or one authorized by the original account holder) 
is seeking access. 
45. § 2703. 
 46.  § 2702(b). It may be, as one state court found, that “court-ordered consent would be 
effective to satisfy the Act.” Negro v. Superior Court, No. H040146, 2014 WL 5341926, at *11 
(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2014). 
 47.  See generally Horton, supra note 28, at 559–61 (discussing survivability of defamation 
and publicity rights lawsuits); 569–70 (noting that it is arguable the SCA “forbid[s] personal 
representatives from taking control of a decedent’s email . . . a result that would make all 
information therein indescendible”).  
 48.  See Kristina Sherry, What Happens to Our Facebook Accounts When We Die?: Probate 
vs. Policy and the Fate of Social Media Assets Post-Mortem, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 185, 193–04 (2012) 
(defining and discussing classes of “digital assets”). 
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The stated and applied purposes of the SCA, its drafters’ 
emphasis on the validity of implied consent as a means of lawful 
consent, and the traditionally understood role of an executor or 
administrator should most strongly inform an analysis of the intended 
meaning of the lawful consent exception. All three factors support the 
view that, in the absence of testamentary language to the contrary, a 
decedent gives lawful consent to the personal representative of her 
estate to access not only her tangible assets but also her digital ones. 
Of course, when a testamentary instrument includes explicit consent, 
then a fiduciary’s access should pose no problem under the SCA. 
B. The Purposes of the SCA 
“When the Framers of the Constitution acted to guard against 
the arbitrary use of government power to maintain surveillance over 
citizens, there were limited methods of intrusion into the ‘houses, 
papers and effects’ protected by the Fourth Amendment,” the House 
Committee Report on the SCA reads. “During the intervening 200 
years, development of new methods of communication and devices for 
surveillance has expanded dramatically the opportunity for such 
intrusions.”49 
The evil that Congress intended to guard against in enacting 
the SCA was clear. In extending Fourth Amendment–type protections 
to digital communications and information, the SCA would perform a 
balancing function: by “protecting privacy interests in personal 
information stored in computerized systems, while also protecting the 
Government’s legitimate law enforcement needs, the Privacy Act 
[would create] a zone of privacy to protect Internet subscribers from 
having their personal information wrongfully used and publicly 
disclosed by ‘unauthorized private parties.’ ”50 In practice, the Act 
functions with the twin aims of limiting the government’s power to 
compel ISPs to provide information and limiting the circumstances 
under which such providers can voluntarily disclose information to 
other third parties.51 
 49.  H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 16 (1986).  
 50.  S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557, 1986 WL 
31929 (emphasis added). In introducing the bill, Senator Leahy explained, “There may have been 
a day when good locks on the door and physical control of your own papers guaranteed a certain 
degree of privacy. But the new information technologies have changed all that.” 131 CONG. REC. 
24, 366 (1985), (statement of Sen. Leahy), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/ls/ 
legislative_histories/pl99-508/cr-24365-71-1985.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/424U-2G23. As 
discussed infra, the role of a fiduciary frequently involves access to just such papers. 
 51.  Kerr, supra note 10, at 1212–13. 
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The theme of Fourth Amendment–like trespass is consistent 
throughout the SCA’s legislative history, and subsequent courts have 
used this analogy to define the scope of the Act.52 In its SCA report, 
the Senate Committee gave insight into the types of privacy violations 
within Congress’s contemplation at the time of the law’s passage. With 
respect to RCS data, the Committee was primarily concerned with the 
vulnerable state of personal information, such as medical and 
business records, stored in offsite data banks. “For the person or 
business whose records are involved,” the Senate report states, 
the privacy or proprietary interest in [the stored] information should not change. 
Nevertheless, because it is subject to control by a third-party computer operator, the 
information may be subject to no constitutional privacy protection . . . Thus, the 
information may be open to possible wrongful use and public disclosure by law 
enforcement authorities as well as unauthorized private parties. The provider of these 
services can do little under current law to resist unauthorized access to [it].53 
This example suggests the Committee’s focus was on several general 
types of unauthorized access by “unauthorized” individuals and the 
government. Possible misuses included potential harm to a subscriber 
(e.g., disclosing information about his medical condition) and 
procuring a benefit for the unauthorized actor (e.g., gaining a business 
advantage by accessing the subscriber’s financial records). 
As mentioned earlier, the SCA distinguishes between two types 
of materials subject to federal protection. Because ISPs can 
voluntarily disclose noncontent material, this presents fewer problems 
for fiduciaries. It is the content-based material, the letter itself rather 
than the envelope, which may have the most useful information to 
fiduciaries and which is subject to more stringent protection. Under 
the SCA, the relevant issue is who is seeking disclosure. If an 
“addressee or intended recipient . . . or an agent of such addressee or 
intended recipient” is seeking disclosure, then the ISP can disclose the 
content to that individual.54 When a third party is seeking disclosure, 
an ISP may only disclose content-based material under certain limited 
circumstances, including—most critically for fiduciaries—with the 
lawful consent of the originator, the addressee, or the intended 
recipient.55 
 52.  See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Permission to 
access a stored communication does not constitute valid authorization if it would not defeat a 
trespass claim in analogous circumstances.”). See generally Cornerstone Consultants, Inc. v. 
Prod. Input Solutions, L.L.C., 789 F.Supp.2d 1029, 1042 (N.D. Iowa 2011) (noting some courts 
have used common-law trespass claims as an analogy). 
 53.  S.REP. NO. 99-541, at 3.  
 54.  § 2702(b)(1). 
 55.  § 2702(b)(3). 
 
7 – Cahn FINAL LOOK (Do Not Delete) 11/18/2014 3:22 PM 
2014] DIGITAL ASSETS 1713 
With this background in mind, it is not surprising that the Act 
treats potential hackers as “computer trespassers.”56 Some courts 
have explicitly adopted this language in their analyses of potential 
SCA violations, analogizing the unauthorized access of electronic 
communications or subscriber information to the tort of trespass.57 
Thus, a husband’s unauthorized reading of his wife’s email messages 
could violate the SCA.58 
On the other hand, in enacting the SCA, Congress sought to 
protect privacy against unwarranted government snooping, rather 
than against the garden variety marshaling of assets engaged in by 
executors and other fiduciaries.59 Nonetheless, this concept of lawful 
consent does create a potential obstacle to providing SCA-protected 
information to an individual empowered by law not only to access the 
assets of, but also to administer the estate of, the account holder.60 
However, the purposes of the SCA, as stated and in practice, belie the 
argument that a fiduciary commits the type of trespass that the SCA 
seeks to prevent. 
 56.  See § 2510(21) (defining a computer trespasser as someone who “accesses a protected 
computer without authorization. . . . [This] does not include a person known by the owner or 
operator of the protected computer to have an existing contractual relationship with the owner or 
operator [to access it.]”).  
 57.  See, e.g., Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1073 (analyzing the statute with basic trespass principles 
in mind); Van Alstyne v. Elec. Scriptorium, Ltd., 560 F.3d 199, 208 n.4 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(acknowledging a court’s use of trespass as an analogy but declining to use it in this case as the 
court found it unnecessary to resolve the question). 
 58.  Bailey v. Bailey, No. 07-11672, 2008 WL 324156, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 2008) 
(rejecting husband's claim for summary judgment that he did not violate the SCA when he read 
wife's emails). 
 59.  Some decedents would prefer that their intimate correspondence never be disclosed to 
anyone—even their executor. Such an issue is not, of course, unique to the digital world. See, e.g., 
Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1175 (2013) (exploring economic costs of restricting the right to destroy 
property post death); John H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt? Trust Law’s Limits on the Settlor’s 
Power to Direct Investments, 90 B.U. L. REV. 375, 378 (2010) (discussing the rule against 
capricious purposes); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 852–54 
(2005) (critiquing and explaining restrictions on trust law preventing some destruction of the 
testator’s property); see also Mary Sarah Bilder, The Shrinking Back: The Law of Biography, 43 
STAN. L. REV. 299, 330 (1991) (reporting on requests by famous authors, including Beckett and 
Kafka, to destroy their works).  
 60.  This need not create an obstacle; indeed, as the federal court in the Facebook litigation 
noted, nothing precluded Facebook from deciding to release the material on its own (the court 
held it had no power to compel Facebook to do so). In re Facebook, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 
1205 (N.D. Cal. 2012).  
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C. Explicit and Implicit Consent 
The SCA’s limitations on disclosure of information have 
significant implications for the administration of digital assets61 even 
though—or perhaps because—the Act does not explicitly address 
whether a fiduciary has such lawful consent to legally access a 
decedent’s digital assets. 
In its short discussion of the lawful consent exception, the SCA 
House Committee Report emphasized that such consent need not be 
explicit. It listed various types of acceptable implied consent, 
consistent with the need to protect against “digital trespassing” and 
public disclosure of the protected information. These acceptable forms 
include “a grant of consent electronically”; consent “inferred . . . from a 
course of dealing between the service provider and the customer or 
subscriber”; “a user having had a reasonable basis for knowing that 
disclosure or use may be made with respect to a communication, and 
having taken action that evidences acquiescence to such disclosure or 
use”; “the very nature of the electronic transaction” (i.e., one that is 
inherently public); and the terms and conditions of the provider’s 
site.62 
While this list does not appear to be exhaustive, it does serve 
as an indicator of the types of implied consent that Congress 
contemplated at the time of the SCA’s passage. All of these examples 
complement the legislative purposes of the Act. If one uses legislative 
history to interpret the meaning of lawful consent,63 then there seems 
to be no question that state-recognized fiduciaries should be included 
within the lawful consent exception. 
Not surprisingly, litigation dealing with the issue of “lawful 
consent” for information from an RCS has often concerned ISPs’ 
disclosure of an account holder's browsing behavior and comparable 
identifying information to third-party advertisers.64 In analyzing 
 61.  See Kristina Sherry, supra note 48 (defining and discussing classes of “digital assets”). 
 62.  H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 66 (1986), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/ls/ 
legislative_histories/pl99-508/houserept-99-647-1986.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G28P-
CPPJ. 
 63.  There is, of course, a massive literature on the persuasive value of legislative history in 
interpreting statutes. E.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 221–30 (2d ed. 2006); John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 
VA. L. REV. 419, 419 (2005); Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The 
Administrative State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890-1950, 123 YALE L.J. 
266, 315–65 (2013).  
 64.  See generally 4 IAN BALLON, E-COMMERCE & INTERNET LAW: TREATISE WITH FORMS 
§ 50.06[4][C][iii] (2d ed. & Supp. 2012–2013) (discussing litigation surrounding implied consent 
and disclosure of information to third parties). 
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whether valid lawful consent was given in these cases, courts have 
examined ISPs’ terms-of-use and privacy policies, and consumer 
conduct indicating possible acquiescence to disclosure.65 These 
situations are prime examples of one type of “trespassing” and 
“disclosure” that the SCA intended to prevent in the absence of 
authorization. By exchanging information about subscribers and their 
online preferences, ISPs and third-party advertising agencies benefit 
financially, possibly at the expense of account holders. While Congress 
did not expressly envision this type of monetary benefit in the mid-
1980s, examples of contemplated implied consent given in the SCA’s 
legislative history provide ample guidance for courts to interpret and 
rule on such situations, even with the comparatively advanced state of 
technology today. 
By contrast, in the executor’s quest to access a decedent’s 
digital assets, there is no obvious direct reference in the SCA’s 
legislative history concerning implied consent. At the time that the 
SCA was passed, legislatures feared disclosure risks concerning 
government searches and seizures, as well as the unknown entities 
who stood to benefit from accessing digital assets. Thus, the provisions 
were relevant to trespass generally and to ad agencies specifically. 
The SCA does not address this information as a personal asset—that 
is, as an intrinsically valuable possession that would provide useful 
information to a fiduciary. 
While the SCA’s creators did foresee the evolution of then-
current technology to more sophisticated systems, they remained 
concerned with protecting people’s online security from unauthorized, 
unknown entities desiring to harm them by publicizing or exploiting 
their information. Lawmakers did not view these advances as we see 
them today—as a set of assets capable of inheritance or facilitating 
access to other assets—and thus did not link the provision of lawful 
consent to the role of an estate executor or administrator. This silence 
and the differences between lawmakers’ stated fears and estate 
administration scenarios provide some evidence that Congress did not 
intend the SCA to preclude a decedent from passing on access to 
digital assets along with the physical assets composing his estate. 
Furthermore, the SCA’s emphasis on implied consent suggests 
that the circumstances of such consent should be evaluated when 
deciding who has been given access to a subscriber’s digital 
information. Consequently, the fiduciary’s traditional role supports 
permitting access to a decedent’s information, since a fiduciary must 
faithfully represent the interests of the decedent. 
 65.  Id.  
 
7 – Cahn FINAL LOOK (Do Not Delete) 11/18/2014 3:22 PM 
1716 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:6:1697 
Executors and administrators have lawful authority to 
administer the estate of the decedent, providing for the distribution 
and care of assets. They are often related to the decedent and, unlike 
anonymous hackers, are chosen by either the testator or the courts. 
This selection endows them with the responsibility of either carrying 
out the decedent’s will or following those procedures established by 
law to administer the estate. An executor or administrator is hardly 
the sort of trespasser envisioned by the SCA, someone who accesses a 
decedent’s information without authorization, intending to benefit 
from such information or to do harm to the decedent. While there is 
always the potential that even an executor or administrator could 
misappropriate SCA-protected information, this risk is present in the 
administration of tangible assets as well as digital ones, and state 
fiduciary law is designed to guard against just such misuse. 
The fiduciary obligations of personal representatives to 
administer an estate in the best interests of the beneficiaries, of 
conservators to administer the protected person’s property in 
accordance with her interests, of trustees to act with loyalty to the 
beneficiaries of a trust, and of agents to act with loyalty to a 
principal66 are frustrated by the denial of their access to digital assets. 
The responsibilities of these fiduciaries underscore the importance of 
acknowledging that they have the lawful consent of the decedent, 
protected person, settlor, or principal to access digital assets. For 
example, personal representatives need to administer the estate as 
quickly and effectively as possible, to prevent the potential identity 
theft that may occur if the decedent’s accounts are left to languish, to 
prevent losses to the estate, and to preserve the decedent’s story to the 
extent possible.67 The drafters of the SCA surely did not intend for 
their limits on disclosure of digital information to frustrate this 
process in the electronic world. Their aim was to provide Fourth 
Amendment-style protection against invasions of privacy, a very 
different issue from the concerns involved when appointing a 
fiduciary. Indeed, some invasion of privacy is inherent in the process 
of administering any estate or acting on behalf of a protected person; 
the goal of such invasion is, however, to act in the individual’s best 
interests. 
Consequently, the SCA’s stated and applied purposes, its 
emphasis on implied consent to disclosure of a communicator’s or 
subscriber’s digital information, and the traditional role of an estate 
 66. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-703 (2010); UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 801–04 (2010).  
 67. Beyer & Cahn, supra note 25, at 137–41. Each of the other fiduciaries has comparable 
responsibilities.  
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executor or administrator can support a court holding that upon 
death, a decedent’s digital assets pass along with his tangible ones, to 
be handled by an estate administrator. That is, even without any 
amendment to existing law or passage of new laws, a court could 
reasonably interpret the SCA to permit a fiduciary to access digital 
assets. Moreover, to the extent the fiduciary steps into the shoes of the 
account holder, there is an argument that the lawful consent 
requirement is irrelevant. 
D. So What About Fiduciaries—In Actions? 
Federal courts have paid little attention to the intersection 
between the SCA and trusts and estates fiduciaries. The earliest—and 
so far the only—recorded case concerned the estate of model Sahar 
Daftary. Daftary, at one time a personal shopper and a Face of Asia 
model, died after she fell from the twelfth floor of the apartment 
building in which her former boyfriend lived.68 The executors of her 
estate sought access to the contents of her Facebook account as part of 
a coroner’s inquest to determine whether her death was a suicide. 
Facebook objected to a subpoena, noting that it could not be compelled 
to disclose pursuant to a voluntary subpoena. In its filing, Facebook 
requested the federal court to issue an order specifying that the estate 
executors could provide lawful consent under the SCA. Facebook 
pointed out that the SCA itself does not clearly authorize personal 
representatives to provide the requisite consent and that Facebook 
could be subject to penalties for a release in violation of the statute.69 
The court agreed that Daftary’s executors could not obtain the 
material through a subpoena, but it then ducked the issue of whether 
the executors could provide lawful consent for Facebook to release the 
material voluntarily. The court stated that it: 
lacks jurisdiction to address whether the Applicants may offer consent on Sahar’s behalf 
so that Facebook may disclose the records voluntarily. . . . Of course, nothing prevents 
Facebook from concluding on its own that Applicants have standing to consent on 
Sahar’s behalf and providing the requested materials voluntarily.70 
 
 68.  Nazia Parveen, Beauty Queen Who Died After Plunging 150 Ft Discovered Two Escorts 
at Her Ex-lover’s Apartment an Hour Before Her Death, MAIL ONLINE (July 24, 2012, 3:02 PM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2178451/Sahar-Daftary-death-Beauty-queen-died-
falling150ft-discovered-escorts-exs-apartment-hour-death.html; Sahar Daftary Inquest: Model’s 
Ultimatum to ‘Husband,’ BBC NEWS (July 25, 2012, 1:07 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
england-manchester-18988374, archived at http://perma.cc/PG2N-QDPM. 
 69. Facebook Inc.’s Motion to Quash Subpoena in a Civil Case at 6–7, In re Facebook, Inc., 
923 F. Supp. 2d 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 5:12-mc-80171-LHK (PSG)), 2012 WL 8505651.  
 70.  Facebook, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 1206. 
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By refusing to resolve the ambiguity surrounding lawful 
consent, the court left Facebook and the executors—and others looking 
for precedent—in legal limbo. ISPs have, in other circumstances, 
disclosed protected material pursuant to a civil court order, although 
in the absence of a court’s explicit finding of lawful consent or that the 
executor is an agent, such disclosure appears to place ISPs at risk of 
violating the SCA.71 
E. But Is Federal Law Really a Problem? 
Violations of the SCA subject various entities to both civil and 
criminal liability, permitting an “aggrieved individual”72 to sue for 
declaratory relief, injunctive relief, damages, and reasonable 
attorneys’ fees. SCA cases so far have typically involved interception 
of electronic communications by an allegedly unauthorized third 
party. Of course, access to communications by a fiduciary presents a 
different situation. It is possible, however, that email recipients or 
civil liberties groups may claim aggrieved status under the SCA. In 
these situations, the fiduciary faces potential liability. 
IV. CHANGES 
The increasing relevance of federal law to state probate laws is 
a cause for examination and, in some cases, concern.73 When it affects 
 71.  Stefanie Olsen, Yahoo Releases E-mail of Deceased Marine, ZD NET, (April 21, 2005, 
7:39 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/news/yahoo-releases-e-mail-of-deceased-marine/142440, 
archived at http://perma.cc/ZL6P-U4T8. Yahoo may only, however, have released the emails 
Ellsworth received. Jennifer Chambers, Family Gets GI’s E-Mail, THE DETROIT NEWS, (April 28, 
2005, 8:01 PM), http://www.justinellsworth.net/email/detnewsapr.htm, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/GUQ8-T9RV. Such an outcome fits within the SCA exception of releasing content to an 
addressee but does not address the question of whether the family members could provide lawful 
consent. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1), (3) (2012).  
 72.  § 2510(11) (defining “aggrieved person” under ECPA as one “who was a party to any 
intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication or against whom an interception was 
directed”); § 2520(a) ( “[A]ny person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, 
disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover from the 
person or entity, other than the United States, which engaged in that violation such relief as 
may be appropriate.”); § 2707(a):  
Except as provided in section 2703(e), any provider of electronic communication 
service, subscriber, or other person aggrieved by any violation of this chapter in which 
the conduct constituting the violation is engaged in with a knowing or intentional 
state of mind may, in a civil action, recover from the person or entity, other than the 
United States, which engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate. 
 73.  See, e.g., John H. Langbein & Lawrence Waggoner, American College of Trust and 
Estate Counsel Joseph Trachtman Memorial Lecture (March 2012), in 38 ACTEC L.J. 1 (2012). 
Two decades ago, I explored how the Domestic Relations Exception may actually show a lack of 
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state inheritance law, federal law can either work in tandem with 
state law or hamper state law. In some instances, federal law can—
and should—play a productive role in state trusts and estates law. At 
the least, in areas where state actions do not threaten federal policies, 
the federal government should leave space for states to continue in 
their traditional roles in this area. “Stale”74 federal laws do (at least 
arguably75) affect fiduciaries in probate law. Existing laws—the SCA, 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and state fiduciary laws—could 
be interpreted to permit fiduciary access without any further action. 
Nonetheless, taking actions to update federal law, or to develop 
uniformity among the states, could ensure certainty and 
predictability. 
A. Amending Federal Law 
The most straightforward approach to clarifying any 
ambiguities surrounding fiduciary access would be adding explicit 
authorization for such access directly into federal law. The SCA’s 
exceptions allowing an ISP to voluntarily disclose could be amended to 
allow for disclosure to the agent of a communication’s originator or for 
an agent to give lawful consent to disclosure.76 The legislative fix 
would be simple: add “or state-recognized fiduciary” to the list of those 
who can provide lawful consent for disclosure. Of course, this 
amendment would still not compel ISPs to disclose, but presumably 
they would, in good faith, comply with a fiduciary’s request. 
On the other hand, the simplest solution of amending the SCA 
is difficult politically. Legislators and commentators have repeatedly 
advocated reforms to the SCA, advancing a variety of different bases 
and multiple reasons, with no resulting change.77 As in many areas of 
respect for its subject. Naomi Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. 
REV. 1073, 1111–15 (1994). 
 74.  See Adam J. Hirsch, Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 WASH 
U. L. REV. 609, 611–13 (2009) (discussing the issue of a “stale will,” when courts have to decide to 
interpret the text “statically or dynamically”). 
 75.  As noted earlier, if the fiduciary is presumed to take on the legal status of the account 
holder, which is the assumption under state laws, then the fiduciary’s consent is sufficient to 
allow for release of content-based information. Fiduciaries assume their authority under state 
law, and in the absence of the presumption that they have the same powers as the original 
account holder, federal law could be used to prevent their access. 
 76.  § 2702(b)(1), (3); see Lamm et al., supra note 31, at 413–14 (proposing similar solution 
and including draft language). The authors are more skeptical than I am about the viability of “a 
clear and comprehensive solution at common law.” Id. at 412.  
 77.  See, e.g., Patrick Leahy, Leahy, Lee Introduce Legislation To Update Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, PATRICK LEAHY, (March 19, 2013), http://www.leahy.senate.gov/ 
press/leahy-lee-introduce-legislatio-to-update-electronic-communications-privacy-act, archived at 
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law, it can be difficult to prompt Congress to take action, and the SCA 
deals with sensitive issues of privacy and national security. 
In the absence of such explicit authorization, state and federal 
courts might simply interpret the statute to permit fiduciary access. 
The Daftary court order left open this possibility and arguably even 
suggested that Facebook might reasonably conclude that Daftary’s 
executors could provide lawful consent. More formally, courts could 
develop a federal common law that recognizes fiduciary control.78 The 
factors that support development of federal common law—“unique 
federal interests at stake, a need for uniformity, and the impropriety 
of relying on state law”79—are present here. Moreover, common-law 
recognition of fiduciary control would facilitate the implementation of 
the SCA and the ECPA,80 forestalling the potential for an increasing 
number of conflicts as fiduciaries manage digital assets. On the other 
hand, the power of federal courts to make federal common law in this 
area is subject to debate.81 
B. Uniformity Among the States 
While the question of whether lawful consent includes state-
designated fiduciaries requires interpreting federal law, states can 
play several different roles. First, in the absence of federal legislation, 
states can enact laws that define lawful consent in the hope that 
federal courts will defer to their definition. Second, they can develop 
laws defining the scope of access, clarifying whether digital assets 
http://perma.cc/WZN9-7VWQ (advocating for an update to the ECPA); Matt Sledge, ECPA 
Amendment Passes, As Senate Judiciary Votes To Require Warrant For Email Snooping, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 29, 2012, 1:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/29/ecpa-
electronic-communications-privacy-act_n_2211889.html, archived at http://perma.cc/DD83-VR2W 
(reporting the Senate Judiciary Committee’s vote to amend part of the ECPA); Kerr, supra note 
10, at 32–36 (explaining why and how the ECPA should be amended); Oza, supra note 36, at 
1068–71 (suggesting amendments to the ECPA). 
 78.  As John Langbein notes, this solution still does not ensure uniformity: “unless and 
until the Supreme Court (or Congress) does the federalizing, disagreements can form among the 
federal courts.” Langbein, supra note 1, at 1692.  
 79.  Gillian Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1293, 1297 (2012). 
 80.  See Mark D. Rosen, Contextualizing Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 781, 804–05 (2008) 
(“[T]he judicial role in preemption matters can be understood as falling within the power of the 
federal courts to create federal common law that helps implement federal statutes.”). 
 81.  See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U. 
PA. L. REV. 825, 826–27 (2005):  
Legal scholars have propounded several theories that attempt to justify the existence 
and scope of federal common law [with some arguing (1) that] federal courts have 
inherent power to make federal common law in certain circumstances; and (2) [others 
arguing] that federal courts have power to make federal common law only if Congress 
has delegated power to them to do so.  
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should—or should not—be treated in the same manner as other assets 
handled by fiduciaries.82 
Indeed, a growing number of states are considering, or have 
already enacted, legislation seeking to authorize personal 
representatives to access digital assets. Existing state legislation 
provides differing levels of access for fiduciaries over differing types of 
digital assets.83 Many state laws have not addressed federal 
communications privacy law.84 
The Uniform Law Commission’s Uniform Fiduciary Access to 
Digital Assets (“UFADA”) Drafting Committee developed a model 
state law that vests fiduciaries with the authority to access, manage, 
copy, or delete digital assets and accounts.85 Unlike existing state 
laws, the model law goes beyond personal representatives to cover 
other fiduciaries as well: trustees, agents acting pursuant to a power 
of attorney, and conservators. The Committee’s goal was to support 
digital access by those whom the original account holder or a court 
had legally authorized to act on the account holder’s behalf. Like 
existing state laws in this area, the model law does not address 
 82.  Many ISPs are concerned about privacy issues raised by fiduciary access to digital 
assets. See, e.g., Letter from Carl Szabo, Policy Counsel, NetChoice, to Rep. Peter C. 
Schwartzkopf, Speaker, Del. House of Representatives (June 12, 2014), http://netchoice.org/wp-
content/uploads/NetChoice-Opposition-to-DE-HB-345-House-of-Representatives.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/WNB4-3WBE (opposing fiduciary access because it “allows fiduciaries to read 
private and/or confidential communications such as spousal communications or a deceased 
doctor’s communications with their patients”). 
 83.  See Chelsea Ray, Note, ‘Til Death Do Us Part: A Proposal for Handling Digital Assets 
After Death, 47 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 583, 601–04 (2013) (examining existing state law 
regarding digital assets); Maeve Duggan, Proposed Law Would Clarify Who Gets Access to a 
Deceased Person’s Digital Accounts, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, (May 6, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/05/06/proposed-law-would-clarify-who-gets-access-to-
a-deceased-persons-digital-accounts/, archived at http://perma.cc/WU54-VL7R (including a table 
depicting various states’ digital assets laws); Beyer & Cahn, supra note 25, at 142–45 
(identifying three generations of state laws based on coverage and access). 
 84. Moreover, state laws in this area are concerned with fiduciary access rather than asset 
distribution and allow existing terms-of-service agreements to control ownership issues. Pending 
Massachusetts legislation would allow for state law on access to trump contrary terms-of-service 
agreements. H.B. 4243, 188th Gen. Court (Mass. 2014); see also Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 987 
N.E.2d 604, 614 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (fiduciary ability to challenge terms-of-service agreement). 
Access is a federal law issue to the extent it concerns electronic communications subject to the 
SCA. Otherwise, because there are few other relevant federal laws, distribution of assets is 
almost always subject to state probate and nonprobate law. See Horton, supra note 28, at 570 
(gently critiquing UFADAA: “what is likely to be the most comprehensive revision to this area 
would not prevent firms from eliminating descendibility through the simple expedient of text on 
a page”). 
 85.  UFADAA (2014). The Committee has observers from the trusts and estates bar and the 
elder law bar, as well as representatives from various types of Internet service and content 
providers. 
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distribution of digital assets, on the assumption that it supplements 
existing state law in this area. 
UFADA sets out two different categories of digital assets: those 
subject to the SCA and all others.86 The uniform act seeks to provide 
fiduciaries with access to digital accounts and assets not covered by 
federal law in the same manner as fiduciaries may access other types 
of property historically subject to their authority. 
For electronic communications addressed in federal law, 
UFADA adopts a similar distinction to that already in the SCA; it 
distinguishes between noncontent material—that is, subscriber 
information that ISPs can voluntarily release without lawful consent 
to any entity other than the government—and content-based 
communication. A fiduciary can only access the content-based 
communication with specific authority to do so. For personal 
representatives, this means a will or, where the will is silent or the 
decedent died intestate, a court order; for conservators, a court order; 
and for trustees and agents, the underlying trust document or power 
of attorney. Where the account holder has affirmatively indicated that 
it does not wish a fiduciary to access these materials, the fiduciary is 
without authority to do so.87 
UFADA seeks to place the fiduciary into the shoes of the 
account holder through a variety of provisions: (1) it specifies that the 
fiduciary should be deemed to have the account holder’s lawful 
consent, to establish that releasing the contents of electronic 
communications complies with the SCA; (2) it clarifies that if any 
digital material was illegally obtained by the decedent, then the 
fiduciary’s attempt to take control of it will not “launder” it to pass 
clean title to the heirs; and (3) it sidesteps contentious issues about 
whether a fiduciary can challenge restrictive terms of service 
precluding transfer or specifying choice of law.88 The Act does include 
 86.  Id. §§ 4–7. 
 87.  Id. § 7(b). 
 88. In general, a fiduciary can assert whatever rights could be asserted by the account 
holder, subject to recognition of the indescendibility of certain types of claims. See, e.g., Ajemian, 
987 N.E.2d at 614 (allowing coadministrators of the decedent’s estate to challenge a forum 
selection clause in a TOS agreement); Horton, supra note 28, at 570 (“The [UFADAA] would give 
personal representatives nearly the same dominion over virtual assets that they enjoy over 
chattels and real estate.”). One concern at drafting committee meetings was fiduciaries’ efforts to 
access and then possibly transfer illegally obtained property, such as pirated material. There are 
potentially interesting analogies to digital property in the gun area (that the author is just 
beginning to explore). See also Lee-Ford Tritt, Dispatches from the Trenches of America’s Great 
Gun Trust Wars, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 154, 175 (2013) (discussing the utility of gun trusts in the 
federal law context of firearm regulation); Nathan G. Rawling, Note, A Testamentary Gift of 
Felony: Avoiding Criminal Penalties from Estate Firearms, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 286, 287–
90 (2010) (noting the interplay of federal and state law in firearm ownership). 
 
7 – Cahn FINAL LOOK (Do Not Delete) 11/18/2014 3:22 PM 
2014] DIGITAL ASSETS 1723 
one right for the fiduciary that goes beyond the rights of the account 
holder: if the SCA permits the ISP to disclose, then the UFADA 
requires the ISP to do so in order to ensure fiduciary access and ease 
of administration, so that the fiduciary has the same knowledge base 
as the account holder.89 
In the absence of specific federal law authorizing or precluding 
fiduciary access, and without more specific definitions of lawful 
consent from either Congress or federal courts, this becomes a 
federalism issue: What happens when a state enacts legislation in a 
field potentially governed by a federal statute?90 Can state law 
establish who satisfies the lawful consent requirement of federal law 
and then mandate that content providers disclose material? Under the 
Supremacy Clause, of course, state laws cannot override federal laws. 
However, even though states cannot require federal courts to interpret 
federal statutes in a specific way, federal courts may look to state law 
for help in interpretation in certain contexts. Consent is a standard 
state law issue present, for example, in tort and contract cases. On the 
other hand, lawful consent may have a specific meaning within the 
SCA. Existing state laws and the UFADA expressly allow fiduciary 
access and define lawful consent, causing a potential conflict with 
federal law. 
Under basic principles of federalism, state law may be 
explicitly preempted when Congress entirely and explicitly displaces 
state legislation.91 That is, a statute may specifically delineate its 
preemptive consequences.92 While the SCA is not explicitly 
preemptive, state law can also be preempted without such a direct 
statement. Implied preemption comes in two flavors: field preemption 
 89.  UNIF. LAW. COMM’N, FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 9 (2014). This has 
been a particularly contentious provision.  
 90.  Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 867 (2000). See RICHARD H. FALLON, ET 
AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 644 (6th ed. 2009) 
(noting that “a federal statutory term [may sometimes be] interpreted as embodying a state law 
definition”). See generally Richard Epstein, Federal Preemption, and Federal Common Law, in 
Nuisance Cases, 102 NW. U.L. REV. 551, 553 (2008) (“On matters of federal-state regulation, the 
basic presumption is one against preemption, subject to some key exceptions.”). For general 
commentary on federalism, preemption, Erie, and related issues, see CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR MILLER, 19 FED. PRAC. & PROC. §§ 4514–20 (2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2014)  
 91.  See Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against 
Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 270 (2012) (noting “some statutes have 
express preemption provisions”). Even the Egelhoff court noted, “There is indeed a presumption 
against pre-emption in areas of traditional state regulation such as family law,” although it 
continued: “But that presumption can be overcome where, as here, Congress has made clear its 
desire for pre-emption.” Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001). 
 92.  Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalism, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
1353, 1366 n.40 (2006).  
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and conflict preemption.93 Field preemption occurs when the “statute 
is written in such a way that it provides no room for the operation of 
state law on the subject,” while “[c]onflict preemption is a narrower 
doctrine, recognizing state law to be preempted when it directly 
conflicts with existing federal law, or when state regulations interfere 
with or frustrate the implementation of congressional objectives.”94 Of 
course, these categories are complex and overlap more in practice than 
jurisprudential, categorical descriptions may suggest.95 
Preemption must be affirmatively shown. Indeed, as Professor 
Daniel Meltzer notes, “a number of canons of construction instruct 
courts to interpret federal statutes in a fashion designed to minimize 
conflict with state policy and state law.”96 That is, the presumption 
against preemption requires a showing of congressional intent to 
supersede state law.97 Courts must decide whether “a statute is 
sufficiently clear to trigger preemption and when it is so ambiguous as 
to leave state law undisturbed.”98 
Particularly if federal law affects a field historically subject to 
state regulation, the anti-preemption presumption seems 
 93.  See Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 239 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(discussing the two categories of implied preemption); FALLON ET AL., supra note 90, at 646 
(distinguishing conflict and field preemption); see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 
238, 248 (1984) (“If Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in 
question, state law is still preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, 
when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or where the state law stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”) . 
 As the Madeira court noted, federal law will not preempt state law under obstacle 
preemption analysis unless “the repugnance conflict is so ‘direct and positive’ that the two acts 
cannot ‘be reconciled or consistently stand together.’ ” Madeira, 469 F.3d at 241 (citing Jones v. 
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 544 (1977)). 
 94.  Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 92. 
 95.  See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Against Categorical Preemption: Vaccines and the 
Compensation Piece of the Preemption Puzzle, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 643, 643–44 (2012) (explaining 
the line between preemption categories is not always clear). 
 96.  Daniel Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 49 (2013); see also 
Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
1501, 1529–52 (2006) (analyzing state court approaches to the interpretation of federal 
statutes from 1789 to 1820); Abbe Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from 
the Inside—an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 901, 942 (2013) (“There are three basic iterations of the federalism-enforcing 
canons, and we inquired about all of them. Two function as presumptions: the eponymous 
‘federalism canon,’ which counsels courts to interpret ambiguous federal statutes so as not to 
intrude on traditional state functions, and the ‘presumption against preemption,’ the default 
principle that courts should not interpret ambiguous federal statutes to preempt state law.”). 
 97.  Bradford R. Clark, Process-Based Preemption, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, 
LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION 192, 193 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009). 
 98.  Id. at 205. 
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appropriate.99 In the trusts and estates area, the Supreme Court 
repeatedly refers and defers to state law, particularly in the transfer 
tax area.100 As the Court noted in 1942, “Grantees under deeds, wills 
and trusts, alike, take according to the rule of the state law. The 
power to transfer or distribute assets of a trust is essentially a matter 
of local law.”101 Consistent with federalism principles, then, a federal 
court might reasonably validate a state law granting a fiduciary 
access to digital assets pursuant to lawful consent.102 
Moreover, although the state has no power to compel an ISP to 
take an action that is contrary to federal law, where federal law 
permits the action and a state then compels it, the two laws can be 
interpreted as in harmony.103 That is, ISPs can comply with state-law 
mandates without violating the SCA. 
An interesting option for testing these federalism principles 
would involve one state enacting the UFADA, with the expectation of 
a test case challenging it, in order to resolve what constitutes lawful 
consent.104 This is a risky strategy that might encourage states to 
delay enactment of the UFADA and could lead to more uncertainty if 
federal courts make conflicting decisions. Pragmatically, state 
legislatures do not necessarily coordinate their sessions and 
enactments in this manner, so states might not wait for the test case. 
Yet, states need to take some action to deal with the increasing 
number of estates with digital assets. Following a decision in the test 
 99.  Arizona v. Inter-Tribal Council of Ariz. Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2256 (2013); Rice v. Santa 
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Clark, supra note 97 at 199. Professor Clark 
observes that, notwithstanding its rhetorical adherence to the presumption, the Court does not 
always apply it. Id. 
 100.  See Mitchell Gans, Federal Transfer Taxation and the Role of State Law: Does the 
Marital Deduction Strike the Proper Balance?, 48 EMORY L.J. 871, 872 (1999) (noting that in the 
“transfer-tax context,” state law plays a large role, often being “determinative”); Jeffrey 
Schoenblum, Strange Bedfellows: The Federal Constitution, Out-of-State Nongrantor 
Accumulation Trusts, and the Complete Avoidance of State Income Taxation, 67 VAND. L. REV. 
1945 (2014); Langbein, supra note 1 (discussing wealth transfer choice of law issues post 
Egelhoff). 
 101.  Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 161 (1962).  
 102.  See Lamm, Thoughts on the SCA, supra note 42 (“I believe that a court would conclude 
that state fiduciary laws . . . are not in conflict with and are not preempted by the [SCA].”).  
 103.   See Negro v. Superior Court, No. H040146, 2014 WL 5341926, at *15 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 
21, 2014) (“Insofar as the Act permits a given disclosure, it permits a court to compel that 
disclosure under state law. It follows that when a user has expressly consented to disclosure, the 
Act does not prevent enforcement of a subpoena seeking materials in conformity with the consent 
given.”). 
 104.  See John Gregory, Fiduciaries’ Access to Digital Assets, SLAW (Jan. 9, 2014), http:// 
www.slaw.ca/2014/01/09/fiduciaries-access-to-digital-assets/, archived at http://perma.cc/CEF5-
NWW3 (noting this would not be a “speedy strategy”). This is an issue that appears rarely in 
existing state legislative efforts, and thus it merits further attention. 
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case, states could simply amend their statutes to establish the 
appropriate procedures for ensuring fiduciary access. 
C. Private Actions 
In addition to, and regardless of, changes in applicable state 
and federal laws, the ISPs themselves might address the lawful 
consent issue. And estate planners have already begun to do so as 
they counsel clients. While these efforts do not resolve potential 
federalism issues directly, they provide alternative means for account 
holders to articulate their preferences. 
Assuming the enforceability of the terms-of-service 
agreements, ISPs can add provisions that authorize legally designated 
fiduciaries to access electronic communications. The SCA House 
Report explicitly notes that this step might be acceptable.105 Or, ISPs 
might establish an opt-in provision, allowing the subscriber to lawfully 
consent to fiduciary access.106 Given the SCA’s deference to the 
subscriber, an individual’s affirmative indication of lawful consent—
either through a terms-of-service agreement or in a separate 
document (such as a trust or will)107—should satisfy the SCA. Such an 
option also allows the subscriber not just to provide consent but also to 
affirmatively withhold consent and thereby preclude fiduciary access. 
 105. H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 66 (1986), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/ls/ 
legislative_histories/pl99-508/houserept-99-647-1986.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/AA5V-Y3B3 
(“If conditions governing disclosure or use are spelled out in the rules of an electronic 
communication service, and those rules are available to users or in contracts for the provision of 
such services, it would be appropriate to imply consent on the part of the user to 
disclosures. . . .”).  
  Of course, this is not spelled out in the statute itself. See also Stephen Breyer, On the 
Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 848–61 (1992) 
(discussing why legislative history should be used in statutory interpretation); Gluck & 
Bressman, supra note 96, at 964–90 (examining the use of legislative history in statutory 
interpretation); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 640–66 
(1990) (analyzing the new textualism approach to statutory interpretation). 
106.  Google, for example, has set up an option that allows users to share data from their 
account with a trusted contact after a certain period of inactivity. About Inactive Account 
Manager, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/3036546?hl=en (last visited Oct. 
5, 2014). While not targeted to legally-appointed fiduciaries, it could be used to permit fiduciary 
access. 
 107.  For suggested language, see, for example, Lamm et al., supra note 31, at 416–18.  
UFADAA allows an account holder to make an affirmative choice in a terms-of-service 
agreement that would limit a fiduciary’s access rights, providing that such a choice would 
supersede a contrary provision in a governing instrument. UFADAA § 8(b) (2014). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Other areas of federal and state law inevitably affect the trusts 
and estates field. Because those laws focus on different goals, they do 
not always assess and specify their impact on wealth-transfer law. In 
an ideal world, the trusts and estates implications would be foremost 
(or at least critically important) in legislators’ minds. 
Given the number of laws without such explicit recognition of 
trusts and estates law, the question is how to proceed. State 
legislators, for a variety of reasons, will probably be more responsive 
than Congress to such concerns. On the other hand, in the absence of 
federal mandates, achieving state uniformity can be difficult.108 Slight 
variations between states lead to undesirable uncertainty for 
fiduciaries and for ISPs. Given the difficulty of developing uniformity 
and in light of the uncertain applicability of federal law, amendments 
to federal legislation would be helpful. This approach ensures 
both uniformity and respect for existing and future state law in this 
area. It is also preferable to the alternative common law approach, 
which is a piecemeal process—even though it should ultimately reach 
the same result. Sorting out how digital assets are the same, and how 
they differ, from other assets is truly a work in progress. 
 
 108.  State law may, however, be “even more uniform than federal statutory law that 
depends on varied state implementation,” as exemplified by “Uniform Laws.” Abbe Gluck, Our 
[National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 2022 (2014). As states enact uniform laws, however, 
local practice may result in variation in the language. Delaware, for example, which became the 
first state to enact UFADAA, based its legislation on an earlier version of the Act. See H.B. 345, 
147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2014). 
 
